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COMMENTS
RECENT LEGISLATION CONCERNING DECEDENTS'
ESTATES
Chapter 81 of the Acts of 1931 (p. 230) changes the law with
reference to the time when claims must be filed against estates
and the time when the final account may be filed. This is done
by amending sections 86 and 157 of the Estates Act, and being
There is no
sections 3152 and 3242 of Burns R. S. 1926.
emergency or repealing clause, nor is there a saving clause removing pending estates from the control of the act. The act
was, by the Governor's proclamation, declared to be in effect
July 1st, 1931.
The effect of the act is to shorten the time from one year to
six months within which claims against estates must be filed,
and to shorten the time from one year to six months in which
the final account may be filed on the conditions stated in the act.
The time in each case is to be computed from the date of issuing
letters, and the completion of the notice of appointment.
It would have been a very simple matter to have inserted a
saving clause in the act providing that it should not apply to
estates, the settlement of which have been initiated in court at
the time the act became effective. To have done this would have
relieved the act of the one single question of its proper application to such pending estates.
The filing of a claim against an estate with the clerk is the
commencement of an action, the same as if a complaint is filed
and a summons issued.
The legislature may at any time change a statute of limitations by either shortening or lengthening the time fixed in the
previous law.
The statute of limitations in effect at the time an action is
commenced, or a claim is filed against an estate, is the only law
on the subject which is then in effect. All other laws on the
subject ceased to exist at the time the current act came into
effect.
The act having cut in half the time allowed for filing claims
against estates, as fixed by the prior law, some may question the
power of the legislature to so alter the law which was in effect
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when the contract was made, which is the basis of the claim. If
any one holds to such view, they are in error. Of course, our
Federal and State constitutions each forbid legislation impairing
the obligations of contracts, but the courts have never held that
a statute of limitations in effect at the time a contract is entered
into becomes a part of or an obligation of the contract. These
statutes are held by the courts to be a part of the remedy for
the enforcement of the contract and may at any time be changed,
provided that the right to an efficient remedy is not destroyed,
and in this connection, it may be said that the judgment of the
legislature as to what is a reasonable time within which an
action shall be commenced, would seem to be conclusive on the
courts.
As to estates which had been pending for one year or more,
when the new act came into operation, the new act has no application as the statute of limitations of one year under the prior
law, had expired, and such estates are therefore not affected by
the new act, and may be settled at any time.
As to estates initiated less than one year before the new act
came into effect, a very different question -arises. When such
an estate was initiated, the limitations as to filing claims was
one year, as fixed by the old act, and creditors of the decedent
had a perfect right to rely on that time within which to file
their claims and they can not be charged with negligence or loss
of right, if they wait until the last day of the year to file their
claims. As said before the new act fixing six months as the
time limit is the only law now in force. The old act fixing one
year ceased to exist on the coming into effect of the new act.
Although the legislature may shorten the statute of limitations,
the courts have held that when this is done, that parties having
had rights of action under the old law of limitations which they
have not exercised at the date of the later act, they shall be
allowed a reasonable time to sue (or file a claim against an
estate) after the coming into effect of the new act. This is not
done by virtue of the new act, but by virtue of the inherent
power of the court to administer justice when its suitor has not
been negligent, but has relied upon an existing law by which his
conduct was justified, until the law was changed, presumably
without his knowledge, consent, or power to prevent.
The plain purpose of the new act is to make it possible to
speed up the final closing of estates, and it should be liberally
construed to accomplish that purpose.
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Among the purposes of administering estates in court are:
the payment of the decedent's debts, the perfecting of titles, the
distribution of the estate to the heirs at law, and the execution
of the testator's will. When an estate has been properly administered, and an adjudication of final settlement has been entered
by the court, all creditors who have not filed their claims are
thereby barred from proceeding to collect the same. However,
if the creditors have not been given the time allowed by law for
presenting their claims, they may have the adjudication of final
settlement set aside, the estate reopened, and they may pursue
the funds of the estate in the hands of the heirs, or resort to an
action on the executor's or administrator's bond. In view of
these well known principles, it becomes important that the courts
take no risks in determining the time after this act came into
effect, which should be allowed for filing claims in estates, the
settlement of which have been initiated prior to the new act.
How is a reasonable time to be determined? May each court
in the state adopt a different rule? Shall a different rule apply
to different estates in the same court, or to different claimants
in the same estate? These questions suggest the variations in
judicial discretion which would be exercised if all these questions may be answered in the affirmative, and so to proceed
would be in total disregard of the desirable rule of uniformity
of judicial action throughout the state.
It is the judgment of the writer that we must seek a solution
of this question by the adoption of the six months limit fixed
by the new law, and add six months from July 1st, 1931, when
the act came into effect, to the time that all estates have been
pending, six months or less before July 1st, 1931. If this rule
is followed as to such estates, no creditor of such an estate can
complain for the reason that he is given the same time, six
months after July 1st, as is allowed to creditors under the new
act, to file claims against estates, the administration of which
shall be initiated after the new act took effect.
As to estates pending more than six months before July 1st,
additional time should be added to the elapsed time, which will
complete a year, thereby giving the claimants in such estates a
full year within which to file claims as allowed by the old law.
This arrangement is not making two classes or rules of decision on the same subject, because to add six months, the limit
of the new law, to estates pending more than six months, would
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be giving to claimants of such estates, more time than was
allowed by the old law, or that fixed by the new act.
This rule of decision would result in the following length of
time which each estate would be pending. All the figures following below represent months. The first column, the months
the estate was pending before July 1st, 1931. The second
column, the months to be added. The third column, the months
that must elapse from the time the estate was initiated before it
can be settled:
1.

Months
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

2.

Months
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
6
6
6
6

3.

Months
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
10
9
8
7

In the first six of the above supposed cases, settlement may
be made under the one year provision provided for in the new
act. In all the other cases, settlement may be made under the
new act providing for the same in less than one year.
The new act provides that a final account may be filed in six
months. If the estate is not ready for final settlement at the
end of six months, but before the end of the year it is in a condition to make final settlement, a reasonable construction of the
act to promote its evident purpose will permit the estate to be
closed at any time after six months and before a year as indicated in the last five of the supposed cases, as set out above.
The second section of the act suggests some further consideration. It provides that the executor or administrator "may
with the consent of the court, in which the estate is pending,"
file a final account at the end of six months. This provision
seems to place the power to proceed at the end of six months in
the executor or administrator alone. The court is given no
power to order a final settlement to be filed at the end of six
months, and the court has the power to deny the right for a
final account to be filed at that time. This language does not
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mean that the executor or administrator can walk into court
and file such an account, but it surely does mean that the consent
of the court to file such an account must be first obtained, and this
can not be obtained excepting upon a petition for that purpose,
which would be a basis for the court's action. Such a petition
should recite the facts that the estate is ready for final settlement,
and that distribution to the heirs can be made. That all known
debts have been paid. That the testator's will has been executed, that there is no pending litigation, and such other pertinent facts as may exist in the particular estate. The court may
consent or it may deny the request, and if it is denied, there
would be no remedy.
The greater number of propositions announced above are so
well known to the seasoned practitioner, that it is unnecessary
to cite authority. The others, not so well known, seem to have
all been settled by a single case and the cases therein cited and
approved. This case was decided by our Supreme Court in 1910,
and has not since been cited or discussed on the questions here
involved. See, Sansberry v. Hughes, 174 Ind. 638.
C. V. MCADAMS.*
* Of the Lafayette Bar.

